Opinion of the Court
change. This freewheeling inquiry provides little notice to landowners of their obligations under the CWA. Facing severe criminal sanctions for even negligent violations, property owners are “left ‘to feel their way on a case-by-case basis.’ ” Sackett, 566 U. S., at 124 (quoting Rapanos, 547 U. S., at 758 (Roberts, C. J., concurring)). Where a penal statute could sweep so broadly as to render criminal a host of what might otherwise be considered ordinary activities, we have been wary about going beyond what “Congress certainly intended the statute to cover.” Skilling, 561 U. S., at 404.
Under these two background principles, the judicial task when interpreting “the waters of the United States” is to ascertain whether clear congressional authorization exists for the EPA’s claimed power. The EPA’s interpretation falls far short of that standard.
B
While mustering only a weak textual argument, the EPA justifies its position on two other grounds. It primarily claims that Congress implicitly ratified its interpretation of “adjacent” wetlands when it adopted §1344(g)(1). Thus, it argues that “waters of the United States” covers any wetlands that are “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring” to covered waters. 88 Fed. Reg. 3143. The principal opinion concurring in the judgment adopts the same position. See post, at 10–12 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in judgment). The EPA notes that the Corps had promulgated regulations adopting that interpretation before Congress amended the CWA in 1977 to include the reference to “adjacent” wetlands in §1344(g)(1). See 42 Fed. Reg. 37144. This term, the EPA contends, was “ ‘ “obviously transplanted from” ’ ” the Corps’ regulations and thus incorporates the same definition. Brief for Respondents 22 (quoting Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 5)).
This argument fails for at least three reasons. First, as we have explained, the text of §§1362(7) and 1344(g)(1)
