Thomas, J., concurring
done, … which tends to destroy the navigable capacity of one of the navigable waters of the United States”); see also Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 104 F. 691, 693 (CA8 1900); Coombs, 12 Pet., at 78. It does not mean that the land itself is a navigable water.[1]
The history of federal regulation of navigable waters demonstrates that Congress’ authority over navigation, as traditionally understood, was narrow but deep. It only applied to a discrete set of navigable waters and could only be used to keep those waters open for interstate commerce. See Port of Seattle, 255 U. S., at 63; Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S., at 709. Yet, where Congress had authority, it displaced the States’ traditional sovereignty over their navigable waters and allowed Congress to regulate activities even on land that could directly cause obstructions to navigable capacity. Gilman, 3 Wall., at 724–725; Coombs, 12 Pet., at 78.
In light of the depth of this new federal power, it was carefully limited—mere “effects” on interstate commerce were not sufficient to trigger Congress’ navigation authority. As one District Court presciently observed in interpreting the term “navigable waters of the United States” in the Steamboat Act of 1838:
“To make a particular branch of commerce or trade within a state, a part of the commerce among the several states, it would not be sufficient that it was remotely connected with that commerce among the several states; for almost everything and every occupation and employment in life are remotely connected with
- ↑ The early 20th century also saw the Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388; Federal Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063; Oil Pollution Act, 1924, ch. 316, 43 Stat. 604; and Flood Control Act of 1936, ch. 688, 49 Stat. 1570, all of which relied on navigability. See Walston 724–726. Although the Acts were also designed to achieve incidental benefits such as pollution control, Congress located its authority in preserving navigation. Ibid.
