say are no where, namely, certain Moral, Logical, and Theological Truths, are really somewhere, viz. in the Soul itself which conceives them; but the Soul is in the Body, as we proved above. Whence it is manifest that the Soul and those Truths which she conceives are as well somewhere as the Body it self. I grant that some Truths as they are Representations, neither respect Time nor Place in whatever sence. But as they are Operations, and therefore Modes of some Subject or Substance, they cannot be otherwise conceived than in some substance. And forasmuch as there is no substance which has not some amplitude, they are in a substance which is in some so•…t extended; and so by reason of their Subject they are necessarily conceived to be somewhere, because a Mode is inseparable from a Subject.
Nor am I at all moved with that giddy and rash tergiversation which some betake themselves to here, who say we do not well in distinguishing betwixt Cogitation (such as are all conceived verities) and the Substance of the Soul cogitating: For cogitation it self is the very Substance of the Soul, as Extension is of Matter; and that therefore the Soul is as well nowhere as any Cogitation, which respects neither time nor place, would be, if it were found in no Subject. But here the Nullibists, who would thus escape, do not observe that while they acknowledge the Substance of the Soul to be Cogitation, they therewithal acknowledge the Soul to have a Substance, whence it is necessary it have some amplitude. And besides, This Assertion whereby they assert Cogitation to be the very substance of the Soul, is manifestly false. For many Operations of the Soul, are, as they speak, specifically different; Which therefore succeeding one after another, will be so many Substances specifically different. And so the Soul of Socrates will not always be the same specifical Soul, and much less the same numerical; Than which what can be imagined more delirant, and more remote from common sense?
To which you may add, That the Soul of Man is a permanent Being, but her Cogitations in a flux or succession; How then can the very substance of the Soul be its successive Operations? And when the substance of the Soul does so perpetually cease or perish, what I beseech you will become of Memory? From whence it is manifestly evident, that there is a certain permanent Substance of the Soul, as much distinct or different from her succeeding Cogitations, as the Matter itself is from its successive figures and motions.
SECT.
