For she may not perceive herself to be somewhere, though she be somewhere, as she may not take notice of her own Individuality, or numerical Distinction, from all other minds, although she be one Numerical or Individual mind distinct from the rest: For, as I intimated above, such is the nature of the mind of Man, that like the eye, it is better fitted for the contemplating all other things, than for contemplating it self. And that indeed which is made for the clearly and sincerely seeing other things, ought to have nothing of it self actually perceptible in it, which it might mingle with the perception of those other things. From whence the Mind of Man is not to have any stable and fixt sense of its own Essence; and such as it cannot easily lay aside upon occasion: And therefore it is no wonder, when as the Mind of Man can put off the sense and consciousness to it self of its own Essence and Individuality, that it can put off also therewith the sense of its being somewhere, or not perceive it; when as it does not perceive its own Essence and Individuality, (of which Hic & Nunc are the known Characters:) And the chief Objects of the Mind are Universals.
But as the Mind, although it perceives not its Individuality, yet can by reason prove to her self that she is some one Numerical or Individual Mind, so she can by the same means, although she by inward sense perceives not where she is, evince notwithstanding that she is somewhere, from the general account of things, which have that of their own nature, that they are extended, singular, and somewhere. And besides, Velthusius himself does plainly grant, that from the Operations of Sense and Imagination, we know our Mind to be in our Body. How then can we be ignorant that she is somewhere, unless the Body itself be no where?
SECT.
