SECT. XXI.
An Answer to the first of the Four Objections.
I.BUt against as well the Nullibists as the Hobbians, who both of them contend that Extension and Matter is one and the same thing, we will prove that the Notion or Idea of a Spirit which we have produced, is a Notion of a thing possible. And as for the Nullibists, who think we so much indulge to corporeal Imagination in this our Opinion of the Extension of Spirits, I hope on the contrary, that I shall shew that it is onely from hence, that the Hobbians and Nullibists have taken all Amplitude from Spirits, because their Imagination is not sufficiently defecated and depurated from the filth and unclean tinctures of Corpority, or rather that they have their Mind over-much addicted and enslaved to Material things, and so disordered, that she knows not how to expedite her self from gross Corporeal Phantasms.
From which Fountain have sprung all those difficulties whereby they endeavour to overwhelm this our Notion of a Spirit; as we shall manifestly demonstrate by going through them all, and carefully perpending each of them. For it is to be imputed to their gross Imagination, That from hence that two equal Amplitudes penetrate one another throughout, they conclude that either one of them must therewith perish, or that they being both conjoyned together, are no bigger than either one of them taken single. For this comes from hence that their mind is so illaqueated or limetwigged, as it were, with the Idea's and Properties of corporeal things, that they cannot but infect those things also which have nothing corporeal in them with this material Tincture and Contagion, and so altogether confound this Metaphysical Extension with that Extension which is Physical. I say, from this disease it is that the sight of their mind is become so dull and obtuse, that they are not able to divide that common Attribute of a Being, I mean Extension Metaphysical from special Extension and Material, and assign to Spirits their proper Extension, and leave to Matter hers. Nor according to that known method, whether Logical or Metaphysical, by intellectual Abstraction prescind the Generical Nature of Extension from the abovesaid Species or kinds thereof. Nor lastly, (which is another sign of their obtuseness and dulness)is
