ber of Monads, which notwithstanding the Intellect divides into two equal parts. And verily in a Metaphysical Monad, such as the Holenmerians conceit the Mind of Man to be, and to possess in the mean time and occupie the whole Body, there may be here again made a Logical Distribution, suppose, è subjectis, as they call it, so far forth as this Metaphysical Monad, or Soul of the Holenmerians is conceived to possess the Head, or Trunk, or Limbs of the Body. And yet no Man is so delirant as to think that it follows from thence, that such a Soul may be discerped into so many Parts, and that the Parts so discerped may subsist by themselves.
SECT. XXVI.
From which a sufficiently fit and accommodate Answer may be fetched to the latter part of this Difficulty, namely, to that which because the parts of Substance are Substantial and Independent one of another, and subsisting by themselves (as being Substances) would infer that they can be discerped, at least by the Divine Power, and disjoyned, and being so disjoyned, subsist by themselves. Which I confess to be the chief Edge or Sting of the whole Difficulty, and yet such as I hope I shall with ease File off or Blunt. For first, I deny that in a thing that is absolutely One and Simple as a Spirit is, there are any Physical parts, or parts properly so called, but that they are onely falsly seigned and fancied in it, by the impure Imagination. But that the Mind it self being sufficiently defecated and purged from the impure Dregs of Fancy, although from some extrinsical respect she may consider a Spirit as having Parts, yet at the very same time does she in her self, with close attention, observe and note, that such an Extension of it self has none; and therefore when-as
