Ages of Ignorance and Superstition, yet one would expect they should have got more cunning. This suppos'd impossibility then of these Performances, seems to me a probable Argument, that they are not wilful and designed Forgeries. And if they are Fancies, 'tis somewhat strange, that Imagination which is the most various thing in all the World, should infinitely repeat the same Conceit in all Times and Places.
But again (2) the strange Actions related of Witches, and presumed impossible, are not ascribed to their own Powers, but to the Agency of those wicked Confederates they imploy. And to affirm that those evil Spirits cannot do that which we conceit impossible, is boldly to stint the Powers of Creatures, whose Natures and Faculties we know not; and to measure the World of Spirits by the narrow rules of our own impotent Beings. We see among our selves the performances of some out-go the conceits and possibilities of others; and we know many things may be done by the Mathematicks and Mechanick Artifice, which common Heads think impossible to be effected by the honest ways of Art and Nature. And doubtless, the subtilties and powers of those mischievous Fiends are as much beyond the reach and activities of the most knowing Agents among us, as theirs are beyond the wit and ability of the most rustick and illiterate. So that the utmost that any Mans reason in the World can amount to in this particular, is only this, That he cannot conceive how such things can be performed; which only argues the weakness and imperfection of our Knowledge and Apprehensions, not the impossibily of those performances: And we can no more from hence form an Argument against them, than against the most ordinary effects in Nature. We cannot conceive how the Fœtus is form'd in the Womb nor as much as how a Plant springs from the Earth we tread on; we know not how our Souls move the Body, nor how these distant and extreme Natures are united; as I have abundantly shewn in my SCEPSIS SCIENTIFICA. And if we are ignorant of the most obvious things about us, and the most considerable within our selves, 'tis then no wonder that we know not the constitution and powers of the Creatures, to whom we are such strangers. Briefly then, matters of Fact well proved ought not to be denied, because we cannot conceive how they can be perform'd. Nor is it a reasonable method of inference, first to presume the thing impossible, and thence to conclude that the fact cannot be proved. On the contrary, we should judge of the Action by the evidence, and not the evi-
