acute, the people are so hungry and the demand for commodities is so great that at present Russia represents a gigantic economic vacuum and no evidence exists that the unfortunate situation above described is likely to be alleviated so long as the present political and economic system continues. Though there is almost no limit to the amount and variety of commodities urgently needed by Russia, the purchasing power of that country is now at a minimum, and the demand must consequently remain unsatisfied.
In some respects the condition of Russia is analogous to that of other European countries. The war has left the people with diminished productive man-power and largely increased numbers of the disabled, the sick and the helpless. In one important respect, however, Russia's condition does not correspond to that of other belligerent states in the world war. While those states are taking such action as is likely to reestablish confidence, the attitude and action of the present authorities of Russia have tended to undermine its political and economic relations with other countries. The Russian people are unable to obtain credit which otherwise might be based on the vast potential wealth of Russia and are compelled to be deprived of commodities immediately necessary for consumption, raw materials and permanent productive equipment. The effect of this condition is that Russia is unable to renew normal economic activities, and apparently will be unable to obtain urgently needed commodities until credits may be extended to Russia on a sound basis.
It should not be overlooked that there has been a steady degeneration in even those industries in Soviet Russia that were not dependent upon imports of either raw material or partly finished products, nor in which has there been any shortage of labor. The Russian production of coal, of iron and steel, of flax, cotton, leather, lumber, sulfuric acid, or copper, of agricultural products, of textiles, and the maintenance and repair
