Opinion of the Court
sources of jurisdiction outside §1252 does not tell us which provisions within §1252 are essential jurisdictional prerequisites. And even if some provisions in a statutory section qualify as jurisdictional, that does not suffice to establish that all others are. Sebelius, 568 U. S., at 155; Gonzalez, 565 U. S., at 146–147. This argument, like the Government’s others, fails to demonstrate that it is “clea[r]” that Congress made §1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement jurisdictional. Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 515. *** Because §1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, it is subject to waiver and forfeiture. See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 3–4). The Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise.
III
The Government now suggests that even if §1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, the Court of Appeals’ sua sponte requirement that Santos-Zacaria comply with §1252(d)(1) can be justified on alternative grounds. Brief for Respondent 26, n. 7. We do not reach that issue. Instead, we hold that, even if §1252(d)(1) were applied here, Santos-Zacaria has done enough to satisfy it. That is, §1252(d)(1) does not require that Santos-Zacaria seek reconsideration from the Board, as the Court of Appeals believed.
A
Under the plain language of §1252(d)(1), a noncitizen
the Government relies on two provisions. Section 1252(a)(5) states that “a petition for review filed … in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of” certain removal orders. Section 1252(b)(9) states that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact … arising from” removal proceedings “shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section,” and, with certain exceptions, “no court shall have jurisdiction” under other provisions.
