Syllabus
(b) Section 1252(d)(1) lacks the clear statement necessary to qualify as jurisdictional. First, exhaustion requirements are quintessential claim-processing rules, designed to promote efficiency in litigation. Treating an exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional would disserve that very interest. Second, §1252(d)(1)’s language differs substantially from more clearly jurisdictional language in related statutory provisions. Elsewhere, including in provisions enacted at the same time and in the same section as §1252(d)(1), Congress specified that “no court shall have jurisdiction” to review certain matters. See, e.g., §§1252(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), (d)(3)(B)(i). Taken together, these two features of §1252(d)(1) establish that it is not clearly jurisdictional. Pp. 4–7.
(c) Given the clear-statement rule, the Government offers no persuasive reason to treat §1252(d)(1) as jurisdictional. First, merely that a statute addresses the “court” and limits “review” does not necessarily mean the statute governs the court’s jurisdiction. Second, the Government fails to show that §1252(d)(1) clearly carried forward any understanding that a prior version of §1252(d)(1) (former §1105a(c)) was jurisdictional. Finally, §1252(d)(1)’s placement within §1252 is insufficient to establish that §1252(d)(1) is clearly jurisdictional. Pp. 7–11.
2. Section 1252(d)(1) does not require noncitizens to request discretionary forms of review, like reconsideration of an unfavorable Board of Immigration Appeals determination. Pp. 11–18.
(a) Section 1252(d)(1) requires exhausting only remedies “available … as of right.” In the context relevant here—review of a legal claim—that phrase means review that is guaranteed, not discretionary. Reconsideration by the Board, however, is discretionary. Board reconsideration is therefore not available “as of right,” and §1252(d)(1) does not require a noncitizen to pursue it. Pp. 11–13.