Cite as 323 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2003)
much of its strength because both [works] were lifelike representations of a natural creature.”). Nature gives us ideas of animals in their natural surroundings: an eagle with talons extended to snatch a mouse; a grizzly bear clutching a salmon between its teeth; a butterfly emerging from its cocoon; a wolf howling at the full moon; a jellyfish swimming through tropical waters. These ideas, first expressed by nature, are the common heritage of humankind, and no artist may use copyright law to prevent others from depicting them.
An artist may, however, protect the original expression he or she contributes to these ideas. An artist may vary the pose, attitude, gesture, muscle structure, facial expression, coat, or texture of animal. An artist may vary the background, lighting, or perspective. Such variations, if original, may earn copyright protection. Because Satava’s jellyfish sculptures contain few variations of this type, the scope of his copyright is narrow.
We do not mean to short-change the legitimate need of creative artists to protect their original works. After all, copyright law achieves its high purpose of enriching our culture by giving artists a financial incentive to create. But we must be careful in copyright cases not to cheat the public domain. Only by vigorously policing the line between idea and expression can we ensure both that artists receive due reward for their original creations and that proper latitude is granted other artists to make use of ideas that properly belong to us all.
Reversed.
James Edward SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
J.M. RATELLE; B. Kathleen Blanchard, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 99-55824.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Dec. 8, 2000.
Submission Vacated Dec. 18, 2000.
Resubmitted March 20, 2003.
Filed March 26, 2003.
Beezer, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion.
