is 621. Now why is the first method of calculating the number of possible cases more legitimate than the second? In any case it is not the definition that tells us. We are therefore bound to complete the definition by saying, "… to the total number of possible cases, provided the cases are equally probable." So we are compelled to define the probable by the probable. How can we know that two possible cases are equally probable? Will it be by a convention? If we insert at the beginning of every problem an explicit convention, well and good! We then have nothing to do but to apply the rules of arithmetic and algebra, and we complete our calculation, when our result cannot be called in question. But if we wish to make the slightest application of this result, we must prove that our convention is legitimate, and we shall find ourselves in the presence of the very difficulty we thought we had avoided. It may be said that common-sense is enough to show us the convention that should be adopted. Alas! M. Bertrand has amused himself by discussing the following simple problem:—"What is the probability that a chord of a circle may be greater than the side of the inscribed equilateral triangle?" The illustrious geometer successively adopted two conventions which seemed to be equally imperative in the eyes of common-sense, and with one convention he finds 12, and with the other 13. The conclusion which seems to follow from this is that the calculus of probabilities is a useless science, that the obscure
