greater, setting aside differences in the terrain, than on one covering only a few miles. In both cases the opposing generals, with a definite object in mind, seek to take advantage of any opportunities which the opponent’s errors or failures may afford. These conditions are what make grand tactics so largely hinge upon opportunity, and a general must never be caught asleep. During the fierce fighting around Liao-Yang, when the situation of his army was for a time so perilous, General Kuropatkin slept, when he did sleep, with a telephone, which could be connected with all his corps commanders, beside his bed. Thus he kept pace with Oyama’s enveloping movement, and timed the counter-attack which so nearly cut off Kuroki’s force from the rest of the Japanese army. But Oyama, equally vigilant, quickly detected his opponent’s design and was able to concentrate enough troops at the threatened point to defeat the movement and reëstablish touch with his own right wing. Was not this action a manifestation of grand tactics under modern battle conditions, which compel commanders to see the actual fighting through the eyes of their lieutenants, but leave the general direction in their hands?
The reasons for this unexpected prolongation of battles are various, and a minute discussion of them is not possible in an article of moderate length, but some of the principal ones may be mentioned. Primarily, the enormous extent of the fighting front has a decided influence. This operates against the spread of demoralization caused by disaster in one part of the field to other parts of an army; and, owing to the great distances involved in the tactical operations, makes possible a rallying and readjustment of partially defeated forces before a success can be decisively followed up. It is practically impossible, under modern conditions, to stampede a disciplined army by a dramatic coup on some part of the field, as formerly frequently happened. No panic can ever involve more than a small part of a great army, for the major part of the troops on both sides will know nothing about it, probably, until hours or days after it is all over. Even after a great battle is decided, many of the strategical units of a defeated army remain comparatively undemoralized, having, perhaps, held their own on their part of the field and withdrawn in good order. Thousands of Russian troops who fought at Liao-Yang think to-day that General Kuropatkin’s retreat was purely strategical and scout the idea of their having been defeated; and they are perfectly sincere in this opinion, which their officers, naturally, do nothing to disturb. Also owing to the extent of the fighting front, the marching evolutions involved in the grand tactics of a battle consume more time, while the waits upon supplies and munitions cause delays not formerly to be reckoned with. Then the exhaustion of the fighting energy of troops, through losses in action, is much less in porportion to the time they are under fire than in former great wars; and this, with the recuperations afforded by more frequent rest periods, prolongs what may be termed the consecutive fighting life of tactical units.
In this war the closer relation of logistics to tactics has been noticeable. Usually logistics (that branch of military art that has to do with the transportation and supply of armies) is considered as more nearly associated with strategy, and this is still true, but it is becoming closely interwoven with grand tactics under modern battle conditions. Formerly, after strategy had got an army into position where it should or must fight a battle, logistics took a back seat until the issue of the struggle was decided and it became necessary to advance or retreat. In those days, a soldier went into battle supplied with enough food and ammunition to see him through the contest. It has been found necessary, in the greater actions of this war, to repeatedly supply the troops with food and ammunition without withdrawing them from the fighting line. This has been a new emergency for the supply departments to meet, on a large scale, and has virtually carried logistics on to the firing line. At Liao-Yang, Russian commissary carts distributed food to the soldiers under a severe artillery fire, and supplies of ammunition were frequently distributed under the same conditions.
The enormous expenditure of ammunition is one of the features of this war. The Russian soldier carries 120 rounds of rifle ammunition into battle, and this will seldom last through a single day’s fighting if the troops become seriously engaged. At Liao-Yang some Russian regiments expended more than 800 rounds per man in the course