stantial evidence of Congress’s intent to change to an objective “reasonable expectation of any profit” standard is required to warrant a deviation from existing statutory interpretation. I also find persuasive the Government’s argument that the statutory scheme is skewed by the majority’s interpretation. It makes section 108(b)’s presumptions favoring dealers and regular investors superfluous.
I would hold that the district court properly instructed the jury that the losses were deductible only if the Wehrlys’ primary motive for entering into the transactions was to make a profit, and would accordingly affirm.
Lee M. SEILER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LUCASFILM, LTD., Industrial Light and Magic, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, George Lucas, Jr., and Joseph E. Johnston, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 85–1955.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted April 17, 1986.
Decided Aug. 26, 1986.
Modified Jan. 26, 1987.