taking up arms. It was, I am convinced, the wisest step that Sir Bartle Frere, as a statesman, could have taken; he foresaw the danger that threatened the colony from Zululand; he was perfectly aware of Cetewayo’s warlike preparations; and he knew, moreover, that all the force that had been collected was eager for a conflict with the whites. The colonists in Natal, and the residents in the south-east of the Transvaal, had been perpetually complaining of the encroachments which the Zulus made, whilst for the last ten years numbers of the Zulus themselves had been taking refuge in both these districts from the cruelty and oppression of the king and the indunas.
If the English Government had not taken the initiative, the whole horde of Zulus, bloodthirsty as hounds, would have overrun Natal, and probably 20,000 lives or more would have been sacrificed. Cetewayo had long made up his mind what he would do; his scheme might cost him many lives, but hundreds and thousands of lives were of little account to him considering the numerical strength of his tribe as compared with all others; it sufficed for him to rely on the courage and daring of his warriors, and thus he was encouraged to indulge his one great vision of becoming master of Natal. Had his venture proved successful, the first terrible result of the victory achieved by him would have been a general rising of the adjacent tribes in revolt against the white men.
I know indeed that there are many men both in South Africa and in England who regard the Zulu war as agreat act of injustice, but I can only express my conviction that the opinion they form is founded
