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maintain existence independently of the mother, or 'viability,' as we term it; but, in a certain sense, it is still dependent on the mother after 'viability;' for, although capable of breathing 'on its own account,' it would perish but for the mother's care and sustenance. Why not, then, decide that it might be a 'Christian duty' to murder the infant six months or a year after birth, or, for that matter, at any time before it is old enough to defend itself? Circumstances of mother or father might be pleaded in justification. Seriously, neither you nor I can say when a being has not 'life or animation' in the sense you probably intend; and if we could determine the exact moment it would not alter the case in the least. The civil law makes some discrimination between 'viability' and 'non-viability;' but science is loudly demanding an obliteration of the absurd distinction, and religion adds her powerful voice. By 'religion' I mean simply, in this connection, the common belief of all Christendom, irrespective of sect or creed. Suppose, sir, you were to imagine that the child, whose advent you so much dread, would be in all respects the superior of the one you now possess, that your love and affection for it would exceed by a hundred-fold that which you entertain for the present; of course you would naturally wish to preserve it, and would take every means in your power to avert the catastrophe which, it so happens, you now desire. But you must not have two children, knowing your 'general circumstances,' as 'you do;' it would then become your 'Christian duty' to murder your present child, and let the other come. In some respects the morale would be in favor of the latter course, inasmuch as it would be so much more easily performed—a little strychnine would do it!—and no danger to life or health would attach to the mother. In the one case you destroy one life and jeopard a second; in
