We hold under these particular facts and circumstances that Shabazz’s waiver was not knowingly or intelligently made. The court was the first to suggest that Shabazz proceed pro se. Shabazz initially indicated that he did not want to proceed pro se; rather, he simply indicated his unhappiness with his current counsel and wanted other counsel appointed. Only when the court informed him that he could not have other appointed counsel and that his trial date would be postponed if he continued with current counsel did Shabazz seemingly agree to proceed pro se; but even then, his agreement was tenuous. We also note there was limited inquiry into his educational history or background with the criminal-justice system. In this regard, the court inquired only if Shabazz had a college degree, to which Shabazz answered no. The court never inquired into Shabazz’s experience with the criminal-justice system.[1] Moreover, while the trial court explained that even with his own experience in criminal matters he would not represent himself, we conclude that this was inadequate to explain the legal pitfalls of self-representation. The trial court did not adequately explain the risks or the consequences of proceeding without counsel; nor did the court inform Shabazz of the danger of proceeding so quickly with the suppression hearing without the benefit of counsel or the completion of discovery. In short, we conclude that there was simply an insufficient investigation into whether Shabazz’s willingness to proceed was knowingly or intelligently asserted, and the trial court’s questioning as to his wish to proceed pro se did not meet the constitutional minimum as set forth by our supreme court.
- ↑ The State in its brief refers this court to Shabazz’s criminal history and his apparent self-representation in other previous criminal or postconviction matters; however, there is no evidence that the trial court was aware of this information at the time it decided to allow Shabazz to represent himself.
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