III. Analysis
Our standard of review is whether the trial court’s finding that the waiver of rights was knowingly and intelligently made was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Pierce v. State, 362 Ark. 491, 209 S.W.3d 364 (2005).
A. Critical-Stage Analysis
The United States Supreme Court has provided the following case law concerning our critical-stage analysis: (1) A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to an attorney at every critical stage of the proceedings. Hammett v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725 (1980); (2) A stage is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding if the substantial rights of the criminal defendant may be affected. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); and (3) The complete denial of counsel during a critical stage of a judicial proceeding mandates a presumption of prejudice because the adversary process itself has been rendered presumptively unreliable. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). Our supreme court has held that a critical stage is characterized by an opportunity for the exercise of judicial discretion or when certain legal rights may be lost if not exercised at that stage. Anderson v. State, 367 Ark. 536, 242 S.W.3d 229 (2006).
We hold that a suppression hearing is a critical stage of the proceeding because if the suppression court determines that evidence is admissible, that determination is final, conclusive, and binding at trial. In fact, the court’s decision on a motion to suppress may often spell the difference between a conviction or an acquittal. Thus, we conclude that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to suppression hearings. The issue then becomes whether Shabazz validly waived that right.
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