Cite as 329 Ark. 143 (1997)
which continued imbibing alcoholic beverages will render him unable to operate an automobile safely.
The rule espoused in Carr was judicially created. When a judicially created rule becomes outmoded or unjust in its application, it is appropriate for the judiciary to modify it. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restr., Inc., 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986), wrote:
Inherent in the common-law is a dynamic principle which allows it to grow and to tailor itself to meet changing needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, which, if correctly understood, was not static and did not forever prevent the courts from reversing themselves or from applying common-law to new situations as the need arose. If this were not so, we must succumb to a rule that a judge should let others 'long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives, do his thinking for him.'
Id., citing, Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105 (Wisc. 1962), quoting Mr. Justice Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum.L.Rev. 735,736 (1949).
[1] In Parish v. Pitts, supra, this Court noted that "the field of common law is not primarily the Legislature's problem, it is the primary concern of this Court. Accordingly, the Court, not the Legislature, should extirpate those rules of decision which are admittedly unjust, for it is to the judiciary that the power of government is given to provide protection against individual hurt." Id. citing, Green, Freedom of Litigation, 38 Ill. L. Rev. 355, 382 (1944). Thus, as a part of our common-law doctrine; this Court is free to amend the common law. True, as we have frequently stated, the legislature may amend or change our common law, but we are not bound to adhere to outmoded holdings pending legislative action. This Court has a duty to change the common law when it is no longer reflective of economic and social needs of society. We conclude, therefore, on the basis of past cases decided by this Court regarding our obligation to adapt our common law to an ever changing society and as a matter of policy, we should recognize a common-law cause of action against a vendor of liquor who knowingly sells alcohol to a minor.
