request of the Sikh Council) that British troops should occupy Lahore till the end of the current year, 1846.
This arrangement, which was ratified by the Treaty of Lahore on March 11, was one of which the success was open to grave doubt; in fact failure seemed more than probable; but considering the importance of the results aimed at, and the evils inseparable from any other scheme, Lord Hardinge held it to be worth trying. What he personally thought of the chances and difficulties of success is shown in the following letter of March 30, 1846, to Lawrence, whom he appointed Agent to carry out the plan: —
'When I consider the character of the Raní, her minister Lál Singh, and the absence of any man of master-mind among the Sikhs to take the helm at this crisis, I confess I think the probability is adverse to the continuance of a Sikh Government.'
And he had already written: —
'The Sikh chiefs, excluded from power, will probably intrigue against the Government, and may attempt to excite the soldiery against those who were parties to the Treaty of Peace. It will be necessary to be at all times in a state of military vigilance.'
Lord Hardinge was never weary of requiring that the Sikhs should be led to understand his policy thoroughly.
'You will' (he wrote to Lawrence) 'on all occasions assure the Sikh rulers that, whilst we do not desire the annexation of the Punjab, the Government is determined not to lend
