rejected, because, owing to the uncertain length of leases, the incidence of the tax may be thrown ultimately on the consumer, and in the end it amounts to the same thing as an irregular excise (26). In a new state this objection does not hold good. This is the case in Ireland; there the payment of the royal quit rents is not at all burdensome. "That country is happy in which by original accord such a rent is reserved. * * * * Not only the landlord pays, but every man who eats but an egg, or an onion of the growth of his lands" (25). The introduction of such a tax into England would be unjust. For suppose A and B had each of them a parcel of land of equal goodness and value. Suppose A has let his land for twenty-one years for £20, and B's land is free. Let a tax of a fifth part be laid; hereupon B will not let under £25, that his remainder may be £20. A must be contented with £16 net; nevertheless, the tenant of A will sell the proceeds of the land at the same rate that the tenants of B will. It is easy to see from this that only those landlords will lose whose rents are already predetermined; the rest will gain by raising their revenues and by enhancing the prices of provisions (25-26).
The first method proposed, namely, the system of Royal Domain, is not so good as the second, because in the latter case the king has more security and more obligees (24).
An assessment on housing is open to the objection of inequality. A house may be regarded in two ways, either as a means of expense, or as an instrument of gain. Which of these standpoints will be selected as the subject of taxation (26)? Assessments on rentals, in order that they may be just, should be levied only
