Cite as 304 Ark. 596 (1991)
discussed, in Gladden, supra, we said "an implied provision against the right to discharge is not enough." Even taken out of context, the sentence does not rise to the level required to state a cause of action. The sentence is: "We believe in working and thinking and planning to provide a stable and growing business, to give such service to our customers that we may provide maximum job security for our employees." In sum, the employment manual did not expressly provide that plaintiffs could be discharged only for cause, and therefore, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action on this count.
[5] Plaintiff additionally contends that his complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action for the tort of outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress. We first recognized this cause of action in an employment setting in M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980). Certain principles have emerged from this and subsequent cases in which we have considered claims for the tort of outrage in employment situations. The conduct giving rise to the cause of action must be extreme and outrageous, that is, "conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Id. at 280, 596 S.W.2d at 687. Initially, the trial court must determine whether conduct may reasonably be regarded as so outrageous as to permit recovery. Givens v. Hixson, 275 Ark. 370, 361 S.W.2d 263 (1982).
Because of the employer's right to discharge an at-will employee, a claim of outrage by an at-will employee cannot be predicated upon fact of discharge alone. However, the manner in which the discharge is accomplished or the circumstances under which it occurs may render the employer liable.
Harris v. Arkansas Book Co., 287 Ark. 353, 356, 700 S.W.2d 41, 43 (1985). The type of conduct that meets the standard for an outrage cause of action must be determined on a case-by-case basis. We have taken a strict view in recognizing such a claim, especially in employment relationship situations. Webb v. Pirelli Cable Corp. of Midwest, Inc., 300 Ark. 613, 780 S.W.2d 571 (1989); Ingram v. Pirelli Cable Corp., 295 Ark. 154,747 S.W.2d
