The GcU>/.J'iy <'l'rge. 235
ss, and would only involve unnen-.ssury loss, the assault having failed. ' '
PICKETT'S REPORT DESTROYED.
Who was responsible for the defective formation will probably never be known. General Pickett's report was suppressed in com- pliance with the suggestion contained in the following letter:
/:'. AVXr/7, Commanding, &c.: GENERAL, You and your men have crowned yourselves with glory; but we have the enemy to fight, and must carefully, at this critical moment, guard against dissensions, which the reflections in your report would create. I will therefore suggest that you destroy both copy and original, substituting one confined to casualties merely. I hope all will yet be well. I am, with respect, Your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE, General.
Colonel Walter Harrison, assistant adjutant and inspector-general of Pickett's Division, in "Pickett's Men," published in 1870, says that "the two other divisions (Heth and Pender) were to move simultaneously in support, charging in second and third lines." This indicates that there was some idea of a triple line at Pickett's headquarters, though Colonel Harrison's narrative of the battle in this and other respects is somewhat faulty.
ORDERS MISUNDERSTOOD.
General Pettigrew was killed a few days after the battle, and made- no report of his division. The reasonable inference is that the orders were misunderstood. The fact still remains, however, that five brigades did not advance to the support of the attacking col- umn, and the left of Pettigrew's line was wholly unsupported.
But there were other and most essential supports ordered to accompany Pickett's advance. General Lee's report, as before quoted, says: " The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely."
General Longstreet says : " I gave orders for the batteries to refill their ammunition-chests, and to be prepared to follow up the ad- vance of the infantry."
