250 Southern Historical Society Papers.
rapidity as to leave General Meade for a time in almost complete darkness as to his enemy's whereabouts and ultimate purpose. He was unwilling, therefore, through undue precipitation, to take any chances of repeating the appalling Federal blunders and disasters of the preceding year on this very ground.
The war records make it perfectly clear now that General Meade lost a great opportunity in this short campaign, for it appears that General Lee was far inferior in strength to the Union army. The very boldness of his movements was calculated to conceal his nu- merical weakness. But with the meagre knowledge Meade pos- sessed of Lee's movements he was undoubtedly justified in a line of action which had the appearance of timidity. If General Pope, in the campaign of 1862, also several days in ignorance of his enemy's whereabouts and intentions, had followed the wise policy of General Meade and fallen back behind Bull Run, there safely awaiting the development of General Lee's purpose, it is unquestionable that he could have received the Confederate attack on his own ground with a force nearly double his enemy, for in that campaign Lee was on the offensive in dead earnest. The result would, doubtless, have been very much more favorable to the Federal cause, as well as to General Pope's personal fortunes.
FOLLOWED HIS OWN JUDGMENT.
So, notwithstanding his President's evident willingness to shoulder the blame for a possible failure, General Meade imperturably followed his own judgment regarding such movements as the military situa- tion seemed to require. He contented himself with calmly reply- ing to the President, through General Halleck, that it was, and had been, his intention to attack when the whereabouts of the enemy was discovered; that only lack of information on this head and fear of jeopardizing his communications with the capital had prevented his doing so thus far. And that was all.
But the pressure from Washington continued, and resulted in the second episode to which I have alluded, two days later. On the 1 8th of October, from the vicinity of Centerville, General Meade telegraphed Halleck asking for information of General Lee's move- ments, and announcing that "it is impossible to move this army until I know something more definite of the movements of the enemy." Everything indicated that the Confederate army was be- tween Bull Run and the Rappahannock, but a rumor had reached
