the loss of the battle, but of the failure of the campaign as originally planned.
Hill's Responsibility.
It was this movement of A. P. Hill on the 24th from Charlestown that disclosed our plan to the enemy and caused it to miscarry. There never would have been a battle at Gettysburg if Stuart had crossed the Potomac on the evening of the 25th. as he had expected. With his transportation destroyed, the canal on the Potomac, which had become his line of supply, broken, and all communications cut between Washington and the North, Hooker's attention would have been drawn from Lee to the Capital, and Stuart would have marched leisurely on to the Susquehanna. Longstreet was at Millwood on the 24th, and marched out of view of the signal station by Bunker Hill and Martinsburg to Williamsport. As he had to march about three times the distance that A. P. Hill had to march from Charlestown to cross at Shepherdstown, Hill might have waited a day and then he, Longstreet and Stuart would all have crossed the Potomac on the same day and would have left Hooker behind in Virginia.
Of course, General Lee did not anticipate that Hooker would follow so promptly and defeat the operation that was originally planned. Still Stuart did cross in the enemy's rear.
Colonel Talcott says it was necessary for the two corps to move on the 24th to support Ewell. But Ewell's, Early's and Rodey's reports show just the reverse. A few militia met them at two or three places, but scattered without firing a shot. When Early got to York he sent Gordon to secure the bridge across the Susquehanna, but the militia set fire to the bridge and ran over the river. Hooker had detached no forces to follow Ewell. General Lee held him in Virginia, while Ewell foraged in Pennsylvania. Jenkins' cavalry was skirmishing with some militia in the suburbs of Harrisburg when Ewell, who was at Carlisle, recalled him.
Stuart's Conduct on June 25th.
Colonel Talcott also says that when, on the 25th, Stuart found out that he could not pass through Hooker's army he ought to
