he needed in the absence of Stuart; but such was not the case. Stuart instructed them to take position on the right and rear of the army when the enemy left Virginia, which they failed to do; and in the light of events it cannot be doubted that Stuart erred in leaving General Robertson in command in Virginia, notwithstanding General Longstreet's suggestion that General Hampton should be left in command, and report to him. (See Longstreet's letter to Stuart of June 22d.) General Heth says "the eyes of the giant were out," but it was worse than that as regards the cavalry left in Virginia; for that visual organ of General Lee's Army made him see the enemy in Virginia, when they were not there.
This would have been less serious if Stuart had crossed the Potomac "in advance of the enemy," as Colonel Mosby says was expected of him, and taken position on Ewell's right. On the other hand, if Robertson's two bridges had been where they should have been, on the "right and rear" of the army in Pennsylvania, the absence of Stuart would have been, to some extent, compensated for, but the absence of both left General Lee without any cavalry between him and the enemy at the critical moment of the campaign, when General Meade changed the plans of General Hooker and was advancing rapidly towards Gettysburg. It was under these circumstances that, as General Heth says, General Lee showed great anxiety to know what had become of his cavalry.
Dr. McKim, in his address published in your issue of February 12th, has very ably met Colonel Mosby's denial of the authenticity of General Lee's reports and his denial of statements in them; but whether it is believed that his reports were authentic or not, there can be no question that General Lee did attribute the failure of the Gettysburg Campaign in part to the absence of his cavalry, for in a letter to William S. McDonald, in April, 1863, which was published in the Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. VII, page 446, General Lee accounts for the failure at Gettysburg and refers him to the official accounts, which is an assurance of the correctness of his official reports, as follows:
"As to the Battle of Gettysburg, I must again refer you to the official accounts. Its loss was occasioned by a combination
