Page:Spencer v. Nigrelli.pdf/10

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Case 6:22-cv-06486-JLS Document 56 Filed 12/29/22 Page 10 of 36

2022 legislation on the books for a few months.[1] See Hardaway, No. 22-CV-771, 2022 WL 16646220, at *6.

And relief remains available to Defendants if they prevail at trial on the merits. If Defendants prevail, the Court could vacate any injunctive relief and allow them again to enforce the houses of worship exclusion.

Thus, the standard remains that Plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) irreparable harm; (2) a likelihood of success on the merits; and (3) that a preliminary injunction is in the public interest. See N. Am. Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 37; Bronx Household of Faith, 331 F.3d at 349.

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits.

1. Free Exercise Clause

The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law … prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I.[2] Plaintiffs argue that, by “prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right in places of worship while permitting its exercise on other private property—and by denying to religious leaders the authority it reserves to other private property owners to permit firearms,” the State “treats comparable secular


  1. The Court recognizes that courts should not lightly enjoin enforcement of laws. The law at issue here, however, is at odds with higher law, namely—the Constitution. The Court notes here too that Plaintiffs would meet the heightened standard in any event—even if it applied.
  2. The Free Exercise Clause applies to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).

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