Page:Spencer v. Nigrelli.pdf/12

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Case 6:22-cv-06486-JLS Document 56 Filed 12/29/22 Page 12 of 36

of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1998)).[1] Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause claims.

a. The Houses of Worship Exclusion Burdens Plaintiffs’ Sincere Religious Practices

Plaintiffs satisfy this initial burden because, on this record, the houses of worship exclusion burdens their sincerely held religious practices. Pastor Spencer believes that he has “a moral and religious duty to take reasonable measures to protect the safety of those who enter the Church.” Dkt. 13-1, ¶ 22. He explained that the “Bible often refers to religious leaders as ‘shepherds’ and tasks them with caring for and protecting their ‘flocks.’” Id. He therefore believes that “providing for the physical safety of the Church—the body of Christ—is [his] religious act and duty as a pastor.” Id. He also believes that “the Bible calls on the Church—as members of a single family united in Jesus Christ—to love, serve, and protect one another.” Id. ¶ 23. These beliefs are “shared by the Church.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 23.

Consistent with these religious beliefs, Pastor Spencer “regularly carried a concealed pistol” on Church campuses and allowed “security volunteers and other churchgoers with New York carry licenses” to do the same. Id. ¶ 24. In short, he


  1. At oral argument, Plaintiffs argued that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Tandon v. Newsom, __ U.S. __, 141 8.Ct. 1294 (2021), they need not demonstrate a burden on a sincerely held religious practice to prevail here. According to Plaintiffs, Tandon instructs that, because the Houses of Worship provision—on its face—targets religious activity, strict scrutiny automatically applies. The State disagreed. The Court need not resolve the issue of whether a threshold showing of a burden on a sincerely held religious belief is required. As discussed below, that requirement—if it exists—is met because the houses of worship exclusion does burden Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious practices.

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