Case 6:22-cv-06486-JLS Document 56 Filed 12/29/22 Page 20 of 36
advance the State’s interest in protecting citizens from gun violence. The State fails to satisfy strict scrutiny.
In sum, Plaintiffs have demonstrated, on this record, that the State has burdened their sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not “neutral” or “generally applicable,” and the State fails to demonstrate that its course was justified by a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest. Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of their claims under the Free Exercise Clause.
- 2. Establishment Clause
The First Amendment to the Constitution also provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I.[1] Plaintiffs argue that, by dictating how individuals may attend worship services, the houses of worship exclusion encroaches on church autonomy in violation of the Establishment Clause. Dkt. 13-3, at 14. According to Plaintiffs, the State “has purported to dictate what churches may permit during religious worship itself—a matter that strikes at the very core of church autonomy.” Id. at 3–4. Albeit a closer question, Plaintiffs are nevertheless likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim.
The First Amendment “protects the right of religious institutions ‘to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well
- ↑ This “mandate has been made ‘wholly applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Montesa v. Schwartz, 836 F.3d 176, 195 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1968)).
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