part of the State, directed to the reformation of morals, there still remains, in this respect, too large and indefinite a field for political enterprise. There has been but little decided, for example, as to the bearing of restrictive enactments on those actions which immediately violate the rights of others; and as to how far the State may proceed in preventing actual crimes by stopping up their sources, not in the character of the citizens, but in the opportunities which facilitate their commission. Now, how far and dangerously it is possible to err in this respect, is already shown by the fact that the very solicitude for freedom has disposed more than one of singular judgment and penetration, to make the State responsible for the whole welfare of its citizens; believing that such a comprehensive arrangement would serve to promote all free and spontaneous activity. I am therefore ready to confess, in view of these considerations, that I have as yet done nothing but separate such large tracts as lie clearly without the circle of political activity, and have not yet endeavoured to draw its precise demarcations; more especially wherever its limits were questionable or unsettled.
This therefore still remains to be done; and, even though I may not be wholly successful in the attempt, it yet seems well for me to ascertain the reasons for the failure, and represent the difficulties incident to the inquiry as clearly and fully as possible. And, in any case, I hope to conclude the subject in a short compass, as all the principles I require for the task have been already discussed and settled, as far as my abilities would allow.
I call the citizens of a State secure, when, living together in the full enjoyment of their due rights of person and property, they are out of the reach of any external disturbance from the encroachments of others; and hence I would call security (if the expression does not seem too brief for
