and second the State must only refuse the right of coercion provided by its laws, without preventing the formation or execution of such engagements, in so far as this execution is mutual; while, in the last instance we have mentioned, it not only can, but must, forbid the very act of engagement itself.
Still, even where there is nothing to be objected to the validity of a contract, the State should have the power of lessening the restrictions which men impose on one another, even with their own consent, and (by facilitating the release from such engagements) of preventing a moment's decision from hindering their freedom of action for too long a period of life. When, however, a mere transfer of things is implied in the contract, without any other personal relation, I do not consider such a course to be advisable. For, firstly, these are seldom of such a kind as to lead to a lasting relation between the contracting parties; secondly, limitations directed to such engagements tend to disturb, far more hurtfully, the security of negotiations; and lastly, for many reasons, but chiefly with respect to the exercise of judgement and strength of character, it is well that the word once given should be irrevocably binding; so that such an obligation should never be removed except where this is really necessary, and that such a necessity does not occur in the case of a transfer of things, is evident from the consideration that however they may hinder certain manifestations of human activity, they seldom tend to weaken the force of energy itself. But with contracts which render personal performance a duty, or still more with those which produce proper personal relations, the case is wholly different. With these, coercion operates hurtfully on man's noblest powers; and since the success of the pursuit itself which is to be conducted in accordance with the contract, is more or less dependent on the continuing consent of the
