Page:Squaring the circle a history of the problem (IA squaringcirclehi00hobsuoft).djvu/19

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GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE PROBLEM
5

straight line, of which the length is equal to that of the circumference of the circle. But a problem of this kind becomes definite only when it is specified what means are to be at our disposal for the purpose of making the required construction or determination; accordingly, in order to present the statement of our problem in a precise form, it is necessary to give some preliminary explanations as to the nature of the postulations which underlie all geometrical procedure.

The Science of Geometry has two sides; on the one side, that of practical or physical Geometry, it is a physical Science concerned with the actual spatial relations of the extended bodies which we perceive in the physical world. It was in connection with our interests, of a practical character, in the physical world, that Geometry took its origin. Herodotus ascribes its origin in Egypt to the necessity of measuring the areas of estates of which the boundaries had been obliterated by the inundations of the Nile, the inhabitants being compelled, in order to settle disputes, to compare the areas of fields of different shapes. On this side of Geometry, the objects spoken of, such as points, lines, &c., are physical objects; a point is a very small object of scarcely perceptible and practically negligible dimensions; a line is an object of small, and for some purposes negligible, thickness; and so on. The constructions of figures consisting of points, straight lines, circles, &c., which we draw, are constructions of actual physical objects. In this domain, the possibility of making a particular construction is dependent upon the instruments which we have at our disposal.

On the other side of the subject, Geometry is an abstract or rational Science which deals with the relations of objects that are no longer physical objects, although these ideal objects, points, straight lines, circles, &c., are called by the same names by which we denote their physical counterparts. At the base of this rational Science there lies a set of definitions and postulations which specify the nature of the relations between the ideal objects with which the Science deals. These postulations and definitions were suggested by our actual spatial perceptions, but they contain an element of absolute exactness which is wanting in the rough data provided by our senses. The objects of abstract Geometry possess in absolute precision properties which are only approximately realized in the corresponding objects of physical Geometry. In every department of Science there exists in a greater or less degree this distinction between the abstract or rational side and the physical or concrete side; and the progress of each