Cite as 39 F.4th 1236 (9th Cir. 2022)
should have discovered, the infringement. Id. at 705.
In addition to first establishing the discovery rule, Roley was important for another reason—while not labeling it as such, it recognized the “separate accrual” rule. In examining whether any actionable conduct occurred in the three years before Roley filed his complaint, we recognized that the statute of limitations runs separately for each successive incident of infringement. See Roley, 19 F.3d at 481. Although we held that “an action may be brought for all acts that accrued within the three years preceding the filing of the suit,” in an ironic twist, Roley was unable to adduce any evidence of any infringing act that occurred during that period. Id. at 481–82.
Fast forward two decades from Roley to Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 134 S.Ct. 1962, 188 L.Ed.2d 979 (2014). There, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the doctrine of laches could bar claims of infringement that accrued within the three-year window of § 507(b). Paula Petrella, the heir to the author of the 1963 screenplay upon which MGM’s 1980 movie Raging Bull was based, renewed the copyright in the 1963 screenplay. Petrella, 572 U.S. at 673, 134 S.Ct. 1962. She became aware that she had a copyright infringement claim against MGM for its continued exploitation of Raging Bull at least as early as 1998, but she waited to commence an action until January 6, 2009, when the movie began to show profits. Id. at 674–75, 134 S.Ct. 1962. However, recognizing that the statute of limitations for copyright claims requires commencement of suit within three years after the claim accrued, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), Petrella sought damages for only those acts of infringement that occurred on or after January 6, 2006. Id. at 674–75, 134 S.Ct. 1962. MGM asserted the defense of laches based on Petrella’s knowledge of her potential infringement claim since 1998. Id. at 675, 134 S.Ct. 1962.
The Court held that laches is not a defense to claims for relief for violations that accrue within the three-year limitations window. It first explained that “the separate-accrual rule attends the copyright statute of limitations,” such that “each infringing act starts a new limitations period.” Id. at 671, 134 S.Ct. 1962. Thus, in deciding that laches is inapplicable, the Court explained that “the copyright statute of limitations, § 507(b), itself takes account of delay.” Id. at 677, 134 S.Ct. 1962. It continued:
As earlier observed, a successful plaintiff can gain retrospective relief only three years back from the time of suit. No recovery may be had for infringement in earlier years. Profits made in those years remain the defendant’s to keep. Brought to bear here, § 507(b) directs that MGM’s returns on its investment in Raging Bull in years outside the three-year window (years before 2006) cannot be reached by Petrella. Only by disregarding that feature of the statute, and the separate-accrual rule attending § 507(b), could the Court of Appeals presume that infringing acts occurring before [three years prior to filing suit] bar all relief, monetary and injunctive, for infringement occurring on and after that date.
Id. (cleaned up).
The discovery rule had no place in the Court’s laches analysis, nor could it. In the course of discussing the question of when a claim accrues, the Court stated the general rule: A copyright claim “ ‘accrue[s]’ when an infringing act occurs,” which it labeled “the incident of injury rule.” Id. at 670, 134 S.Ct. 1962 (alteration in original). It then dropped a footnote, noting that
[N]ine Courts of Appeals have adopted, as an alternative to the incident of injury
