Page:State v. Little Rock, Mississippi River and Texas Railway.pdf/12

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
712
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS,
[Vol. 31

State of Arkansas vs. Little Rock, Mississippi River and Texas R'y Co.


case, by Art. v. sec. 22 of the Constitution, it is ordained that "No public act shall take effect, or be in force, until ninety days from the expiration of the session at which the same was passed;" and, consequently, the act did not take effect, and was not in force, until ninety days after the 10th of April, 1869; so that, in fact, on the 3d of November, 1868, ten months before the act took effect, when, it is claimed, that an election was held and a majority vote taken in favor of railroads, the act authorizing the same was not in force; and if not, then the election was held without authority of law, and was void.

In so holding, we are sustained by several decisions to which we will refer:

In the case of Wheeler v. Chubbuch, 16 Ill., 361, the question presented for the consideration of the court was, as to the time when an act of the legislature of Illinois took effect. The act was to prevent sheep and swine from running at large in Henry, Will, Livingston and Lake Counties, approved January 29, 1853. The act provided, "that from and after the 1st day of March next, it shall not be lawful for any person, or persons, possessor, or possessors of any sheep and swine, to allow them to run at large within said counties."

Carton, judge, when considering the time when the act took effect, said: "The question is, as to whether the law took effect and became in force before the expiration of the sixty days from and after the close of the session at which it was passed. We think it did not. The 23d section, Art. 3, Constitution, declares: "And no public act of the General Assembly shall take effect, or be in force, until the expiration of sixty days from the end of the session, at which the same may be passed; unless, in case of emergency, the legislature shall otherwise direct. * * * * * * But such direction must be made in clear, distinct, and unequivocal provisions; and cannot be helped out by any sort of intend-