Gorsuch, J., concurring
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” §2000d. The Equal Protection Clause reads: “No State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Amdt. 14, §1. That such differently worded provisions should mean the same thing is implausible on its face.
Consider just some of the obvious differences. The Equal Protection Clause operates on States. It does not purport to regulate the conduct of private parties. By contrast, Title VI applies to recipients of federal funds—covering not just many state actors, but many private actors too. In this way, Title VI reaches entities and organizations that the Equal Protection Clause does not.
In other respects, however, the relative scope of the two provisions is inverted. The Equal Protection Clause addresses all manner of distinctions between persons and this Court has held that it implies different degrees of judicial scrutiny for different kinds of classifications. So, for example, courts apply strict scrutiny for classifications based on race, color, and national origin; intermediate scrutiny for classifications based on sex; and rational-basis review for classifications based on more prosaic grounds. See, e.g., Fisher, 579 U. S., at 376; Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493–495 (1989) (plurality opinion); United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 555–556 (1996); Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 366–367 (2001). By contrast, Title VI targets only certain classifications—those based on race, color, or national origin. And that law does not direct courts to subject these classifications to one degree of scrutiny or another. Instead, as we have seen, its rule is as uncomplicated as it is momentous. Under Title VI, it is always unlawful to discriminate among persons even in part because of race, color, or national origin.
In truth, neither Justice Powell’s nor Justice Brennan’s opinion in Bakke focused on the text of Title VI. Instead,
