than can be any French polity. Every educated person is aware that customary law has a place, and fills a considerable rôle, in the English Constitution; it is not so generally known that in the United States customary law has been the origin of more than one powerful and original development of the Federal Constitution. I have tried in the preceding pages to put this fact in a clear light with reference to the powers of the Senate. It is no less apparent in the system of graduated elections which, as regards the presidential election, has gradually grown up, side by side with the plan provided by the letter of the Constitution.
Is it necessary for me to dwell further on the importance and the bearing of the contrast on which I have been insisting? Slow changes, careful transitions, which follow and reflect the natural progress of events; half concealed and almost unconscious transformations, which do not run counter to consecrated formulas until innovation has secretly gained over the instincts of the people, and has allied itself with long custom — all these different forms of growth take place more easily in England, and even in the United States, than in France. As much may be said for the partial modifications of the Constitution, which though in appearance arbitrary are in fact the work of a statesmanlike instinct, constantly checked by regard for what is practical and expedient. In France the logical perfection of the Articles of the Constitution causes this danger; if any any modification be once admitted, the whole Constitution is put in question, and is liable to be re-arranged in accordance with the new principle which is involved
