replaced[1] them in the electoral body. It does not exist. The thing was done silently, without its being thought necessary to sanction it by a statute. The first time that any trace of such an Act is found is in a statute of Queen Anne’s reign, in 1712 (10 Anne, c. 23); but the terms of the Act are not explicit, and take for granted that the custom was already established. Thus the right of the clergy to vote at elections though contrary to the practice of several centuries, and opposed to a long line of precedents was ultimately established simply in virtue of a custom in its favour, which custom itself rested on the mere fact that taxation of the clergy by themselves had fallen into disuse. This is enough to make a Frenchman shudder, possessed as he is with a spirit of love for all that is precise, exact, and explicit, so passionate that it is like a French legislative instinct.
For what end have the English kept the privileges and the interaction of the great public powers in this undetermined and fluid state? The object is evident. They have wished for a Constitution in which considerable changes, alterations of power, and unexpected revivals could be made almost without remark. There has been many a modification of the Constitution in England over which not a word was breathed, nor a drop of ink spilt, whilst in France it would have necessitated an alteration in the Articles of the Constitution, followed by long and brilliant discussions and much public excitement.
For instance, the royal veto, so greatly abused by
- ↑ [See Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, p. 44 (D).] sect, iii]
