DAVIS 715 third of the force with which it invaded Penn- sylvania ; the losses of the western array were still greater. To remedy these deficiencies the president recommended " restoring to the army all who are improperly absent, putting an end to substitution, modifying the exemption law, restricting details, and placing in the ranks such of the able-bodied men now em- ployed as wagoners, nurses, cooks, and other employees as are doing service for which the negroes may be found competent." For the financial troubles no remedy could be found. Mr. Memminger, whose administration of the treasury department had proved a palpable failure, resigned, and Mr. Trenholm took his place with a reputation for financial talent from which much was expected. But no talents, no ingenuity could arrest the down- ward tendency of the confederate currency. There was little coin in the country, the people would not submit to taxation, and enormous issues of paper promises to pay stimulated a general spirit of speculation, which accelerated the downfall of the already tottering structure of the confederacy. Equally difficult of remedy was the deficiency of food. With the loss of Kentucky and Tennessee the confederacy lost the main source of its supplies of meat. The army was already on half rations, and the man- agement of the confederate commissary depart- ment was a cause of mu6h complaint against the president, who was charged with keeping for personal reasons an unfit man, Col. Nor- throp, at the head of it. A committee of the confederate congress, however, who investi- gated the matter, made a report which amply vindicated the commissary general. It was not his mismanagement, but the failure of the resources of the confederacy, that was reducing the army to starvation. The same excuse can also be assigned for the alleged indifference of Mr. Davis to the sufferings of the Union prisoners, who were unques- tionably insufficiently fed ; though no excuse can be given for the ill treatment to which they were subjected by brutal jailers acting under the authority and control of the confed- erate president. It is said by confederate writers that President Davis displayed unusual energy and skill in preparing for and carrying on the campaign of 1864, which it was felt by both parties was likely to decide the issue of the war. It opened with confederate successes in Florida, in the southwest, and in North Carolina; which however were of little im- portance compared with the great struggle in Virginia between Lee and Grant, and the brilliant march of Sherman upon Georgia and through Georgia to the sea. The confederate general in command of the forces opposed to Sherman was Joseph E. Johnston, between whom and President Davis no great cordiality had existed since the beginning of the war, while during the progress of events in Georgia a marked difference of opinion had developed itself. Early in 1864 Mr. Davis had warmly approved an offensive campaign, while Gen. Johnston maintained that it would be impolitic to risk a battle, and insisted upon standing on the defensive. The result of this conflict of opinion was that on July 17, 1864, an order was issued to Gen. Johnston requiring him, as he had "failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta," to turn over the command of his army to Gen. Hood. This change of commanders in the very crisis of a great campaign was loudly complained of by a large portion of the southern press, and was imputed to personaUmotives on the part of the president. These criticisms were apparently justified by the ill success of Hood in attempt- ing to arrest the advance of Sherman, and his consequent evacuation of Atlanta on Sept. 1. This great blow to the confederacy caused President Davis to visit Georgia, partly to attempt to restore harmony in that state and to check the advance of Sherman. Governor Brown was notoriously disaffected to the con- federate administration, and to President Davis, whom he charged with total disregard of the rights of the states. Mr. Davis, in repeated interviews, sought to convince the governor that he was mistaken in this particular, but to no purpose. On his way to Hood's army Mr. Davis made a speech at Augusta, in which he said : " Four years we have stemmed the tide of invasion, and to-day are stronger than when the war began ; better able now than ever to repulse the Vandal who is seeking our over- throw. . . . All things are fair ; and this con- federacy is not yet played out, as those declare who spread their own despondency over the whole body politic." He also addressed the citizens of Macon, admitting the perils of the situation, and concluding thus : " If one half of the men now absent from the field would return to duty, we can defeat the enemy. With that hope I am now going to the front. I may not realize this hope ; but I know that there are men there who have looked death too often in the face to despond now." On Sept. 18 he reached Hood's headquarters, and reviewed the army, making a speech of en- couragement, and promising a speedy advance northward. This advance was made. Hood's army marched into Tennessee, expecting to deter Sherman's advance by cutting his com- munications; but the movement left Georgia and South Carolina unprotected, and Sherman, regardless of the force in his rear, marched with little molestation upon Savannah, and thence toward Richmond. Southern writers friendly to Mr. Davis maintain that Hood's campaign was not planned or authorized by the presi- dent, while those not friendly to him assert just the contrary. Hood himself, in taking leave of his army in January, 1865, said in speaking of his unfortunate campaign, " I alone am responsible for its conception." The whole situation was succinctly described by Sherman in a telegram to Washington : ' ' Hood has crossed the Tennessee. Thomas will take care of him
