394 FRANCE in giving immediate force to several promised reforms, and the general distrust of his inten- tions, combined to diminish the at first unusual popularity of Ollivier's ministry. The new- government, which had seemed about to intro- duce in France a constitutional regime, grad- ually lost the public confidence. In March the draft of a new constitution was submitted to the corps legislatif. While it confirmed the measures of reform already adopted, it did not include the hoped-for provision making the ministers responsible to the legislature instead of to the emperor ; and it conferred upon the emperor the right to " appeal to the people " to sustain him in his acts ; a provision which was generally looked upon as a mere cover for the continuance of the old personal government, and a device for concealing Napoleon's retreat from his promises to give to the legislature that power which it should have in a constitu- tional form of administration. The new con- stitution itself was submitted to the people, by this form of "appeal," instead of to the corps legislatif. Having been confirmed by a senatus consultum (April 20), a plebiscite was ordered upon it for May 8. By the most strenuous ex- ertions of the imperialists, and their interfer- ence everywhere with the elections, the result was made to show more than 7,000,000 affirm- ative votes, against fewer than 2,000,000 nega- tive and illegal ballots. The large cities cast a great proportion of the negative votes ; in the army and navy 47,000 persons voted "No." In spite of this result, the situation of internal affairs was extremely grave; and it is not to be doubted that, in the hope of warding off a more serious crisis, Napoleon rather favored than retarded the progress of those foreign complications which, in the early summer of 1870, began to assume a threatening aspect. For a considerable period indefinite rumors of a possible alliance between France and Austria against the increasing power and pretensions of Prussia had agitated European diplomacy. Of late they had gained in distinctiveness. The position of Austria did not appear decided, but in France unmistakable manifestations of a hostile spirit on the part of the government were made ; chief among them, perhaps, was the appointment to the ministry of foreign af- fairs of the duke de Gramont, well known for his hostility to Prussia. Hardly had this ap- pointment been made when an unexpected event occurred, which hastened the rapidly increasing complications, and furnished what was taken by the French as an immediate cause of war. This was the declaration of the candidature of the Hohenzollern prince Leo- pold for the throne of Spain. On July 6 Olli- vier and Gramont declared in the corps 16gis- latif that such a candidature, agreed upon without the knowledge of the French govern- ment, could not be permitted by France. The greatest excitement against Prussia followed, both in the corps legislatif and among the peo- ple. The voluntary withdrawal of Prince Leo- pold did not end the matter. Benedetti, the French ambassador to the Prussian court, who had before been instructed to request the king of Prussia to command Prince Leopold's retire- ment from the candidature, was now instructed to demand of that monarch an explicit promise that no prince of Hohenzollern should ever in the future be a candidate for the Spanish crown. This demand, especially when pressed upon the king (who was then at Ems) in an unwarranted and even insolent manner, was decidedly refused (July 13). The king denied to Benedetti another interview ; and the latter was recalled by Napoleon, while Prussia imme- diately withdrew her representative from the French court (July 14). Five days later, and after the failure of the proffer of mediation made by England and also by the pope, war was formally declared by France (July 19). The short time elapsing between the first pub- lic warnings of approaching hostilities and this formal declaration had been sufficient to per- mit popular enthusiasm in both countries to rise to the highest pitch ; but in the matter of actual military preparations the two nations found themselves, as events proved, in widely different conditions. In France, where mea- sures for the increase and reorganization of the army and for the improvement of the military situation in all respects had occupied for sev- eral years a considerable part of the attention of the legislature, the preparation for a possible war had been perhaps more conspicuous than in the North German confederation; but so much less thorough in many respects had been the carrying out of the French military system that its results did not bear out the estimates upon which both people and government re- lied. The French army at the beginning of 1870 nominally numbered on a peace footing about 400,000 men; it was supposed from the estimates that it could be raised on a war foot- ing, and including the national guard and all branches of the service, to nearly twice that number. That these expectations, however, were based upon exaggerated estimates of the numbers as well as of the immediate availabil- ity of the troops at command, appeared at the very beginning of military movements. The number of troops in the active army at the dis- position of France at the beginning of the war was, according to the best military authorities, about 427,000 ; there were about 87,000 regu- lar reserve troops in addition to these; and the entire force of men who, besides all those just named, could still be called out in the most extreme emergency (chiefly those em- ployed in garrison duty), was about 157,000. The active or field army, which it is alone ne- cessary to consider at this time, had been rap- idly prepared for war for several months be- fore the declaration. The preparation of mu- nitions and the purchase of horses and pro- visions were carried on with great energy throughout the months of May and June ; while the organization of the line and the as-
