ROBBERY 355 that her ear was entirely torn through, the perpetrator was held guilty of robbery. The violence and putting in fear, moreover, must precede the taking. If a man quietly steal anything from the person, though he after- ward retain possession of it by violence or by intimidating the owner, this is not robbery ; for the fear is subsequent to the larceny, and no violence subsequently used, even with re- spect to the same thing, will operate so as to convert that into robbery which was before only larceny. But if a man be knocked down without any previous warning, and then strip- ped of his property while senseless, though he could not properly be said to have been previ- ously put in fear, yet it would be a robbery. If the violence be fraudulently used under color of some legal proceeding ; or if money be forci- bly extorted under pretence of a purchase or sale ; or if a man beg in a menacing manner, as with a drawn sword in his hand, and re- ceive alms from the party through the appre- hensions regarding his personal safety which the appearance and actions of the beggar natu- rally excite in his mind ; in all these cases it will still be robbery. Thus, where the prison- er forcibly took a bushel and a half of wheat worth 8s. from a woman, and compelled her to accept 13d. for it, threatening to kill her if she refused, this was held to be robbery by all the judges in England. It is not necessary that the delivery of the money or goods should be contemporary with the violence or the imme- diate effect of it ; as, if a robber, finding but a small sum of money about a man's person, com- pel him to swear under a threat of death in case of non-compliance to bring him a larger sum, which the man does, this is robbery, because the terror caused by such a menace is upon him at the time of his making the payment, and was the cause of his doing so. The payment of money or delivery of goods by the owner, under the fear of having his property destroyed, is robbery in the receiver. And it is an im- portant rule that the violence is sufficient to make the crime robbery, although it consist entirely of a threat to disgrace a person. The fear arising from a menace of accusing one of a dreadful crime which would endanger his personal safety, or lead to the loss of his char- acter or situation, is equivalent to the fear of personal and immediate violence ; and to ex- tort money by such means is robbery. But the fear thus excited must not only be such as will suffice to influence or even to constrain the or- dinary action of the will ; it must entirely and immediately control and overpower it, and ren- der the person incapable through terror or con- fusion of resisting the demand. For this rea- son, in a case where the prosecutor, who was threatened with having such a charge made against him unless he complied with the pris- oner's demand, did not part with his money immediately upon the threat being made to him, but on the contrary did so after the per- son making the threat had left him, and af- forded him sufficient time in which to consider the matter, and apply for assistance if he de- sired so to do, and after he had consulted with a friend who was actually present when he paid the money, here it is considered that the prosecutor was not impressed with such ter- ror as to render him incapable of resisting the demand; that there was not the continuing fear which could operate in constantem virum from the time when the money was demanded until it was paid ; and consequently there was neither the actual nor constructive violence which was necessary to constitute the crime of robbery. Further, it is not necessary that the fear should be of violence to the person robbed. If the threat is made against a man's wife or child, or other person to whom he is bound by ties of blood and affection, and he gives money to the robber for the sake of saving such person from immediate danger or violence, this would be as much a robbery as if the vio- lence were offered to himself. Neither is it necessary that the robbery should be the sole and original motive of the person making use of the violence, if the violence so used led to this result; as, where a man feloniously as- saulted a woman, who, without any demand on his part to that effect, offered him money, which he took, yet continued to treat her with vio- lence, for the accomplishment of his original purpose, until interrupted by the approach of others, this was held to be a robbery ; for the woman, terrified by the prisoner's behavior, offered the money to save herself from further violence, which otherwise she would not have given voluntarily. It was a principle of the common law that no restitution of stolen goods could be awarded upon an indictment, inasmuch as it was at the suit of the king only, and the owner could only obtain restitution by an ap- peal of robbery, which was the suit of the par- ty; but this has long fallen into disuse, and subsequent statutes have remedied the defect. Formerly, when a robbery or other felony had been committed in England, a hue and cry should be raised, which was the old common law process of pursuing with horn and with voice all felons. In this hue and cry all per- sons, both officers and private individuals, were called upon to join ; and no hue and cry was deemed sufficient unless made with both horse- men and footmen. In order that such hue and cry should be more effectually made, the hun- dred was bound to answer for all robberies therein committed unless they captured the felon; and this responsibility is the founda- tion of the ancient action against the hundred for any loss by robbery. If the robber was taken, the hundred stood excused ; but other- wise the party robbed was entitled to prose- cute it by a special action on the case for damages equivalent to his loss. In order fur- ther to encourage the apprehending of robbers, certain rewards were offered to such as would bring them to justice, by various acts of par- liament, one of which enacted " that such as
