been elected with the express understanding that he is to support a particular measure, or a particular set of principles, sees reason to change his opinion, he would act most in conformity with the spirit of the institutions, by resigning his trust. All human contracts are made subject to certain predominant moral obligations, which are supposed to emanate from Divine Truth. Thus, a representative, conscientiously entertaining convictions in its favour, may give a pledge to support a particular measure, as a condition of his election, there being no sufficient reason to doubt that the doctrine of specific pledges is sound, the people having a free option to exact them, and the candidate as free an option to withhold them, as each may see fit. These pledges, however, must be in conformity with the spirit and letter of the constitution, and not opposed to good morals; the first being a governing condition of the social compact, and the last a controlling principle of human actions. But, while this much is admitted in favor of the power of the constituency, great care must be had not to extend it too far.
In the first place, no constituency has a right to violate the honest convictions of a representative. These are a matter of conscience, and, if the subject be of sufficient magnitude to involve conscientious scruples, the power of the representative is full and absolute. This freedom of conscience is an implied obligation of the compact between the parties; therefore, in a case of importance, that admits of moral doubts, and one in which the will of the constituency is unequivocally expressed, it becomes the representative to return the trust, and this, too, in season, circumstances allowing, to permit the other party to be represented in the matter, agreeably to its own opinions. As there are so many governing circumstances of great delicacy, in
