ment is a compact between persons; in the other, a compact between states.
In a government like that of the United States, the executive is as much representative as the legislature. Will it therefore be pretended that the president is also bound to respect the instructions of the people? Is he to appoint those whom the people will, remove those whom the people denounce, pardon those whom the people order, and approve of such bills as the people dictate? Is he to command the army and navy, see that the laws are executed, and conduct the negotiations of the country according to the opinions and intimations of a majority of his constituents, or according to his own conceptions of duty, and the light of his own knowledge and experience? If the representative is bound to obey the will of his constituents, all this must the president do, or prove false to the institutions. As the commander in chief, his own soldiers would have a right to instruct him in the mode of performing his military functions, as, indeed, they would have a right to tell congress, when and against whom to declare war!
If the representative of the executive functions is thus bound to respect instructions, a majority of the people might virtually repeal an unpopular law, by instructing the president not to see it enforced, and thus destroy the rights of third parties. Such a doctrine would throw society into confusion, leave nothing stable, and set up a dangerous and irresponsible power, that would be stronger than the institutions themselves.
A principle reason for sending representatives to congress, is the impossibility of masses of men meeting to legislate with due knowledge and deliberation, and it can scarcely be contended that the results which cannot be obtained by any expedient of law, method
