give to a legislation that controls peace and war, and the foreign relations; as well as the exposure to forign influence directly exercised over irresponsible men; and the general character of deliberation and examination which is secured to congress, which may be called on to act on information known only to itself; we are led to conclude that the doctrine of instruction is unconstitutional, whether as applied to the senate, or to the house of representatives, and that so far from being a doctrine that is adapted to secure the domination of real majorities, it is rather an invention of intriguing politicians to effect their own wishes, in opposition to those of the nation. Exceptions may occur, but governing principles are to be settled on general rules, and by general effects.
It being established that the representative is placed beyond the control of instructions, as beyond doubt is, at least, his legal position, the importance of making careful selections, becomes apparent. There is no safer rule in selecting a representative, than that already named; or that of choosing the man for public confidence, who may be relied on, in private. Most of all is the time-server and demagogue to be avoided, for such a man is certain to use power as an instrument of his private good. It is a mistake to suppose, on correct principles, that the representative is the obliged party. The man who faithfully does his duty in congress, is a servant to whom a difficult task is assigned, with a very insufficient compensation; and such a man should always be selected with care, and rewarded with a frank gratitude.
It is a painful admission, extorted by truth, that in human institutions, the intention is never long respected. Representation may not be in practice, what it was intended for, in theory, but, still, it might be drawn much nearer to what it ought to be, than it
