2 CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL. [Number 1,
and defects. Most of these, however, are not intrinsic, but remediable by well-considered legislation. Undoubtedly, that portion of the involuntary feature of the present law, which makes it an act of bankruptcy merely to suspend payment, or fail to meet one's commercial paper for fourteen days, is, under the existing state of the finances of the country, harsh and oppressive, and it ought to be immediately repealed, or essentially modified. There is no such feature in the English bankrupt laws. By the English acts, "the suspension of payment by a banker, merchant, or trader, of his commercial paper and liabilities, is resolved into an act of bankruptcy by summoning him before the court of bankruptcy, and if the debt or demand be not paid or arranged to the satisfaction of the creditor within a prescribed time, the non-arrangement or non-payment, within such prescribed period, constitutes an act of bankruptcy." (James, Bankrupt Law, 261; In re Clemens 2 Dillon C. C., 536.) This provision is much preferable to the similar one in our act, and even this might be too stringent at the present time.
In a gust of seeming popular feeling, the house of representatives recently passed a bill for the absolute repeal of the bankrupt act. The senate seems wisely to insist upon time for consideration. In a matter of so much consequence, it would appear to be the part of true wisdom, to repeal at once only those portions of the law which are not adapted to existing circumstances, and which work harshly, and then, following the course which is so often adopted in Great Britain in respect to important legislation, appoint a commission to investigate the defects and imperfections of the present act, and report such changes as experience has demonstrated to be necessary for the successful working of the system. Such a commission, composed, in part, of members of congress and of one or more of the federal judges, and an attorney of large experience in bankruptcy proceedings, would doubtless be able to suggest such amendments to the existing law, as to make its workings satisfactory to the country at large.
The Late Mr. Justice Nelson.
The death of this distinguished jurist, which occurred on the 13th of December last, at his home in Cooperstown, N. Y., makes it fitting to refer to his life and character, and to draw from them the lessons they are so well calculated to teach. We have long regarded him, in his personal and judicial character, as the highest type of an American judge. His whole life was given to his profession. Born in 1792, he was admitted to the bar in 1817, and continued in the practice until 1823, when he was appointed one of the circuit judges of the state. In 1821, however, he was a member of the constitutional convention of New York, and it is said that it was in this body that his great legal abilities first became generally known, and that this led to his selection and appointment to the bench two years afterwards. He went upon the circuit bench in 1823, and remained there until 1831, when he was transferred to the supreme bench of the state, in the place of Judge Marcy, elected to the senate, and he continued to be an associate justice of that court until 1837, when he was commissioned to be its chief justice, and he remained such until 1845, when he was appointed by President Tyler, an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and remained such until his voluntary retirement from the bench in November, 1872.
Lacking but a few months, therefore, he was a judge, without interruption, for fifty successive years. He was, in fact, judicially employed for more than fifty years; for, after his retirement, he investigated a most complicated cause, and prepared an elaborate and masterly opinion in it, which was completed only a short time before his death.
Judge Nelson's personal appearance was impressive. No one who ever saw his erect bearing, his massive frame, his large head, with its flowing white hair, the clean cut features of his handsome but strong face, could forget his striking presence.
But his character as a judge is that which endears his memory, and will perpetuate his fame. His integrity—that commonest, but indispensable quality in a judge—no man ever questioned. The simplicity of his nature was never corrupted, nor its strength enervated by the luxurious and extravagant tastes and habits which, unhappily, have become too prevalent in these latter days. To the end, he preferred the quiet of his rural home, beside the waters of the beautiful lake on which he lived, to a residence in the great metropolitan city, within his circuit, or in the feverish atmosphere of the capital.
His love of justice was intrinsic, predominant and supreme. He had been favored by nature, in an extraordinary degree, with what may be called the judicial temperament.
His patience was invincible; his equanimity of temper never deserted him; and he was incapable of becoming a partisan in the trial or hearing of a cause, or of receiving an undue bias, or of yielding to hasty and crude views.
We have good authority for the statement, that in the heat and ardor which sometimes attend the discussions of the conference room, one member was never known to lose his evenness of temper, and that was the illustrious deceased.
His judgment was almost unerring, and was noted for its breadth and soundness. His learning was varied and extensive, and he brought to the discharge of his duties in the federal courts, the great experience of his long service upon the nisi prius and appellate bench of the state.
The opinions of no judge in the country were more deferentially submitted to than his; and he seemed equally conversant with the peculiar and difficult questions of federal jurisprudence, which arise under the constitution and statutes of the United States, and with questions of commercial, international and admiralty law. His knowledge of the law relating to patents for inventions, and his skill and judgment in the decision of questions of novelty and infringement have, perhaps, never been surpassed.
An admirable judicial quality of Judge Nelson's was his utter want of pride of individual opinion. He seemed to care nothing for views which he had expressed when upon the supreme bench of the state or upon the circuit. If satisfied, after more reflection and further argument, that he was mistaken, he would be the first to insist on setting the law right, and correcting his own errors. The judgment of the future will confirm the verdict of the present, that the deceased was
