But after the kidnapping lawyers put in their evidence, the counsel for Mr. Burns asked time for conference and consultation, as the most important questions of law and fact came up; they were weary with long service and exhausting labour—and they begged the Commissioner to adjourn for an hour or two. It was already almost three o'clock. When hard pressed, he granted them thirty minutes to get up their law and their evidence, take refreshment, and come back to court. At length he extended it to forty minutes! Much of that time was lost to one of the counsel by the troops, who detained him at the door. But the next day, after Mr. Burns's counsel had brought in evidence to show that he was in Boston on the 1st of March,—which nobody expected, for Brent alleges that he saw him in Virginia on the 19th of March, and that he escaped thence on the 24th,—then, after a conference with the Marshal, he grants the kidnapper's lawyers an hour and a quarter to meet this new and unexpected evidence. Of course he knew that in granting them this, he really gave them all night to get up their evidence, prepare their defence, and come into court the next morning, and rebut what had. been said. Is that fair? Consider what a matter there was at stake—a man's liberty for ever and ever on earth! Consider that Mr. Loring was judge and jury;—that it was a "court" without appeal; that no other court could pass upon his verdict, and reverse it, if afterwards it was shown to be suspicious or proved to be wrong. He grants Mr. Burns thirty minutes, and the other side, at once, an hour and a quarter, virtually all night! That is not all. His decision was limited to one point, namely, the identity of the prisoner. If Mr. Burns answered the description of the fugitive given in the record, the Commissioner took it for granted, first, that he was a slave,—there was no proof; second, that he had escaped into another State—that was not charged in the record, nor proved by testimony; third, that he owed service and labour to Colonel Suttle, not to the lessee, who had a limited fee in his services, nor to the mortgagee, who had the conditional fee of his person; but to Colonel Suttle, the reversioner, the original claimant of his body.
Now the statute leaves the party claimant his choice