Our relations to Russia are equally vital. Conditions there will continue for a long time unsettled. Not only is it impossible to foresee clearly the early outcome of the campaigns of Kolchak and Denikin who are undoubtedly, though not very firmly, backed by the Entente, but it is impossible to tell, how soon and under what conditions an agreement will be reached between the various local de facto governments which arose on the ruins of old Russia, with the Ukrainians, White Russians and the Baltic and Caucasian nations. It is most probable that problems of internal reconstruction will for a long time disturb the Russian nation, and that Russia therefore will for some time take no strong part in foreign politics. That also requires a reserve on our part, and a responsible statesman cannot be swayed by partisan considerations or personal sympathies to favor this or that tendency; he must see the development to which the state as whole is tending, he must realize in what relation the policy of our state will stand in the near future toward the state form which will soon emerge there. Our foreign attitude must be dictated by this reserve and this view of the near future. Resides, as we have no desire as a state to interfere in Russian internal questions, it is the duty of all of us to maintain a reserve toward Russia and fairness to all sides. The whole world knows that we love Russia, the whole world knows that we desire a rapid reconstruction of the Russian nation and state, that we wish to collaborate in the building up of a great, democratic, confederated Russia which will conduct together with us a friendly, Slavic, democratic policy. We got into a fight with the Bolshevik government against our desires, for we followed the principle of not interfering in Russian quarrels. We wanted to get our army to France as soon as possible, to fight against the common enemy in the West. Conditions have changed, but our policy has not changed. We still endeavor to have our boys return home after five terrible years. And just before we left Paris, we received efficient assistance from the Allies which will make the rapid return of the army possible.
Besides these three cardinal problems of our foreign politics we must consider the relations to our immediate neighbors. We have often spoken of our extremely friendly feelings for the Jugoslavs. They must of course remain such, for the Jugoslav nation is indeed very near to us; not merely our interests, but our sentiments dictate closest friendship. It is self-evident that with Italy, too, we desire friendly and loyal relations of allies, such as we had during the war. We proved on many occasions that we mean this in earnest. That need not, however, militate against our excellent, friendly ties with the Jugoslavs; quite the contrary.
Our relations to Roumania and Poland must be so shaped that the nation can feel absolutely secure, that from their side there is not merely no danger threatening us, but that we can count on their peaceful co-operation in the cultural, financial and economic field. It will take a certain amount of time, before a tradition of friendly Czecho-Polish relations will be formed. It would be useless to hasten things unduly; but it is well to emphasize that the Poles are so situated that they need good relations with us far more than we need them. Their existence will continue to be more endangered than ours. Polish public opinion and Polish parties are still too excited to appreciate their real international position. They lack an impartial view of themselves and are in error. We have today before us the question of plebiscite which is a certain form of struggle, to be decided legally and peacefully, but since it has been imposed upon us, we must fight it out energetically to the very end. But I have not ceased hoping that we shall reach an understanding. In the meanwhile we must act seriously and critically, with dignity and tact.
There remains the question of our relations to the Magyars and Austrians. We are still swayed by our feelings and lose sight of the fact that for centuries we have been in close contact with these two nations and that in the future these relations cannot be simply broken off. In a short time we shall have to consider carefully and sensibly the direction of our politics as regards Vienna and Budapest. The aims of our diplomacy in this respect must be clear, and I believe that we can trace their main out lines now. Prague will acquire its full importance as the capital of central Europe, if we are wise. That is at the bottom the significance of the struggle of Prague against Vienna and Budapest during the war, and in fact for the last few centuries. But let us remember that we must reckon with Vienna as a political factor, even though it is greatly weakened. When after the execution of Austrian peace our bills are settled, we can cultivate with Vienna loyal, sensible and amicable international relations. Economic interests that bind us to the Alpine provinces will strengthen this policy. But we have had lessons from history that we are not likely to forget.
The same thing is true of the Magyars. They will depend completely on their neighbors, they will have to seek allies, if they want to save at least their national existence. We shall be fair toward them, and it is in our interest to have close relations with them, if they act loyally toward us. One of the first tasks of Czechoslovak diplomacy will be to show the Magyars that we do not threaten their national existence. They will appreciate it, and that will make possible the formation of a new political system in Central Europe, based on an understanding between us, Jugoslavs, Roumanians and Poles.
To sum up, the immediate principles of our foreign policy will be: 1. To maintain our
