force of your country, and one which, while you preserve it, will always render you powerful.' The Peninsular War and the battle of Waterloo, however, diverted the mind of the country from the navy, and for many years after the conclusion of peace, in 1815, we were content to rest upon the glories we had achieved, exhausted by that long continued struggle. Our maritime strength gradually declined, but it was not until the Reform Bill of 1832 was passed that the navy suffered materially from the desire for economy in State expenditure which then prevailed. At that time the naval estimates for the effective service were about £4,250,000. In 1834 this was reduced to £3,000,000, and in 1835-36 to £2,750,000. Our squadrons maintained abroad gradually dwindled in numbers, and it seemed as if a perpetual peace was expected. Not content, however, with reductions in the number of ships employed, the complements of individual vessels were reduced to what was termed a peace establishment, and we even went so far as to send vessels abroad without some of their guns. I believe it is a fact that a line-of-battle ship about this time was sent as flagship to a station without her lower deck guns, in order to give more room for the admiral's staff. During the first half of the century few changes had been made in naval architecture or armaments. Fleets still consisted of sailing line-of-battle ships, frigates, and smaller vessels. Officers were discussing the value of square or round sterns, the latter introduced by Sir Robert Seppings, then Surveyor of the Navy. The square stern was constructively weak, and the guns it
