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MIND AND ITS OBJECTS
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physical. Call these things physical or what you will, if they are the most real of realities, then nominalism has gone by the board, and the realism of the modernist is joining hands with the realism of the schoolman. There appears to be indeed a twentieth century realism which cuts down physical reality to the imperceptibles of science—something scarcely belonging even to the world of primary qualities; but this is a half-theory of the Lockeian type, though it pushes abstraction one stage further than his. Our realist's doctrine of the physical world gives us a far fuller picture of the reality which is in principle the same for all and accessible to all. And moreover, as I said, all the modern realists, I think, agree in recognising the reality—whether as existence or as subsistence—of universals.

The interest of the theory we have been contemplating has lain for me in noting what I take to be the inevitable results of reducing the place of the mind in the actual world to its narrowest conceivable limits. This result