And these traditional rules were the foundation of ascribing logical priority to one case of implied proposition (Consequent or Conclusion) over its implier (Antecedent or Premisses).
Therefore it seems clear that the rules of implication by which Logical Priority is ascribed to Consequent and Conclusion over Antecedent and Premisses are in flat contradiction with those by which it is ascribed to Premisses of deduction over its Conclusion.
It is surprising, primâ facie, that Logical Priority should be ascribed to Consequent over Antecedent, and to Conclusion over Premisses. But the definition of Logical Priority, and also along with the rules of implication traditional and Formal Logic, leaves no escape.
On the other hand, to obtain what seems primâ facie more natural, the Logical Priority of the Premisses over Conclusion, we saw that rules were appealed to which defy the traditional rules of logical implication.
I will draw out the contrast between the two sets of rules.
1. Thus we have it alleged on one side, in support of Logical Priority of Premisses over Conclusion—of Ma over Me—that the truth of the Premisses in an "explicit deduction" need not imply that of the Conclusion—the truth of Ma need not imply that of Me; i.e., that the Conclusion can be false while the Premisses are true. On the other side, in showing the Logical Priority of Consequent and Conclusion over Antecedent and Premisses, the appeal was to the ordinary rule of Formal Logic, that truth of Premisses or Antecedent implies that of Conclu-
