We should note first, by way of digression, the relation of the two requirements of Logical Priority as applied in this same case. In the same "explicit deduction," falsehood of Conclusion is not to involve falsehood of Premisses, and falsehood of Premisses is to involve falsehood of Conclusion; in other words, the truth of the Premisses is not to imply the truth of the Conclusion, and the truth of the Conclusion is to imply the truth of the Premisses. Is not this very hard to believe? The explanation of the two rules being maintained together is surely that indicated above, p. 67. The former rule contemplates the admission of bare empirical conjunctions into the deductive chain. The latter implies the admission of only such precisely conditioned and exclusive Premisses as are rightly held—we shall see—to be implied in the Conclusions drawn from them. Thus we can at least see a meaning in denying the normal implication of truth of Conclusion in that of Premisses, if the former, as emanating from a bare conjunction, gives more than a scientifically conditioned inference would warrant. And we can also justify, in a limited sense, the implication from truth of Conclusion to truth of exclusive minimum Premisses. This is a new proposal, which I welcome.
But, returning from this digression, we have to note the contradiction with the ordinary rule, as stated in the last paragraph but one.
Here I make no doubt that the ordinary rule is wrong, in so far as it denies all implication of Premisses in Conclusion. Of course you may have the same Consequence implied by a number of alternative Antecedents and the same Conclu-
